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1 Introduction
Fertility rates declined in most of the industrialized countries during the last decades
(see for example Eurostat (2004), United Nations (2007)). Consequently, popula-
tion growth rates decreased and will eventually even turn negative. Two central
questions on the economic implications emerge in this context: First of all, will this
development lead to a decrease in per capita output and if so, are there policies that
could counteract its undesired development? Secondly, what are the redistributional
eﬀects between diﬀerent age groups that are associated with such a demographic
change?
The theoretical literature dealing with the ﬁrst question can be distinguished
into four categories: Exogenous growth models (see for example Ramsey (1928) and
Solow (1956)) predict an inverse relationship between population growth and per
capita output levels, since capital intensities increase if the population size decreases.
In contrast, endogenous growth models (see for example Romer (1990), Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)) which concentrate on modelling
research intensities, point out that a decline in the population size leads to fewer
resources devoted to research and therefore to lower per capita output growth even in
the long run. Jones (1995) showed that these models were not supported by empirical
evidence, and he paved the way for scale free semi-endogenous growth models (see
also for example Kortum (1997) and Segerstr¨ om (1999)), where population size
does not matter for long-run economic growth but rather persistent changes in the
population size are important. A positive population growth rate is associated with
positive long-run per capita output growth, whereas a stagnation of the population
size eventually leads to a stagnation of per capita GDP. Another model class, dealing
1with the interrelations of population growth and economic development are uniﬁed
growth models (see for example Galor and Weil (2000) and Strulik and Weisdorf
(2008)). In these models a very long time horizon is analysed. The argument is that
initially, per capita output growth was triggered by the demographic transition,
i.e. falling population growth rates which led to an escape from the Malthusian
trap. Evidently, theoretical models are inconclusive about the relationship between
demographic change and per capita output growth, and the eﬀects largely depend
on the speciﬁc underlying assumptions.
To investigate the consequences of low fertility - in particular the eﬀects of popu-
lation ageing as resulting from persistent low fertility - on economic growth we start
with a model of endogenous fertility and endogenous investment in children’s human
capital. Similar to recent work by Lee and Mason (2008) and based on the quality-
quantity tradeoﬀ model by Becker and Tomes (1976), our model implies that lower
fertility induces higher educational investments and hence, higher per capita out-
put. In addition we take two eﬀects into account: on the one hand, human capital
depreciates over the life-cycle as people tend to forget things they once learned; on
the other hand, on the job training may increase experience and therefore improve
the skills of unexperienced young workers over time. We refer to the ﬁrst eﬀect as
human capital depreciation and to the second eﬀect as learning by doing. For the
sake of tractability we rely on a model speciﬁcation without technological change but
the main results carry over to the case where technology evolves exogenously. This
framework is an appropriate description of a small economy whose technological
frontier is determined by the rest of the world.
Regarding the second question on redistributional eﬀects between age groups
caused by persistent low fertility, we refer to the vast literature that links cohort
size and macroeconomic outcomes (e.g. Macunovich (2002) for an excellent review).
In this paper we focus on changes of the age structure of the labour force and their
implications for wages and age speciﬁc productivity (Welch (1979), Lam (1989)).
In particular we assume that workers of diﬀerent age are not perfect substitutes
in the production process. Evidence from the management literature (see for ex-
ample Guest and Shacklock (2005) and Skirbekk (2005)) indicates that young and
mature workers do exhibit diﬀerent attributes. For example, employers report that
younger workers tend to have better physical strength and endurance, vision, hear-
ing, cognitive processing, intellectual capital, and adaptability, while mature workers
are perceived as having better people management skills, judgement that depends
on experience, reliability/dependability, loyalty, and attendance. These diﬀerences
suggest that assuming imperfect substitutability between workers of diﬀerent age is
2desirable. Consequently, any change in the age structure of the workforce – as a
consequence of demographic changes that induce changes in the labour supply – will
aﬀect the intergenerational wage distribution. Besides the direct impact of changes
in the age structure, the intergenerational wage distribution will also be determined
by the human capital level of young vs. mature workers as it might change over
cohorts and ones life-cycle. The cohort eﬀects are captured by the assumption that
parents decide on the human capital level of their children in combination with their
number. Obviously, any change in the quantity of children caused by low fertility
will impact on the quality of children. To study the life-cycle changes of productiv-
ity, we investigate the role of depreciation vs. appreciation (e.g. through learning
by doing) of human capital during the working life. As our results show, higher
relative human capital levels of young workers vs. mature workers does not need to
imply higher relative returns in terms of wages.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce our theoretical
model and in section 3 we present the central analytic results. In section 4, two
economies are simulated for identical parameter values except the ﬁxed costs of
children. Consequently, the two countries will diﬀer with respect to fertility rates
and hence with respect to their demographic developments. The diﬀerences of these
two economies with respect to per capita output as well as the implications of low
fertility for the distribution of income between young and mature workers (across
generations over time) are illustrated. Finally, in section 5 we draw conclusions and
sketch out opportunities for policy-makers to intervene.
2 Structure of the model
The framework used to describe our economy is an overlapping generations version
of a neoclassical growth model with endogenous fertility and endogenous educational
decisions. The population consists of four cohorts, children, young workers, mature
workers and retirees. Each phase in an individual’s lifetime lasts for twenty years,
such that people die at the age of eighty.
Children do not face a decision problem, they receive consumption goods and
education from their parents. Parents are young workers who have to decide how to
allocate their potential income between consumption and investment into oﬀspring.
Note, that they do not face a savings decision at this stage. Investment into oﬀspring
either takes the form of investments into the number of children or investments
into their education. This reﬂects the well known quality-quantity tradeoﬀ (see for
example Willis (1974) and Becker and Tomes (1976)). In particular, the utility
3function of young workers is a generalized version of the utility function applied in
Galor and Weil (2000), adapted such that it allows for a diﬀerentiation between
young and mature workers. Mature workers face the dynamic decision problem of
optimally allocating their income between current consumption and consumption
in the next stage of their life-cycle when they are retirees and do not have labour
income. Hence, by assuming that only mature workers save, we decompose the
whole life-cycle optimization into two sub-problems: one for young workers and one
for mature workers. While this assumption allows us to solve the model analytically,
it is also justiﬁed by empirical observations: net savings of individuals tend to peak
between the age of 40 to 59 (see for example B¨ orsch-Suppan et al. (2008)).
The ﬁrm sector uses labour input of young and mature workers and capital to
produce a ﬁnal good, which can be considered as a consumption aggregate. Young
workers and mature workers are imperfect substitutes in the production process, so
we introduce a parameter that measures incomplete substitutability between these
two groups of workers. Finally, we assume that markets are perfectly competitive,
such that factors are paid their marginal products.
Subsection 2.1 formally describes the decision problem of young workers, subsec-
tion 2.2 refers to human capital depreciation and learning by doing eﬀects, subsection
2.3 formally describes the decision problem of mature workers and subsection 2.4
refers to the production side of the economy.
2.1 The decision problem of young workers
The utility function of young workers is a generalized version of the one used by
Galor and Weil (2000), where utility positively depends on own consumption, the
number of children, and children’s own potential income in the two periods when


















where subscripts refer to time and superscripts refer to the date of birth of the
respective cohort. U
t−1
t describes utility of young workers in period t, c
t−1
t refers
to consumption of young workers in period t, nt is the number of young worker’s
children, wt
t+1ht
t+1 the potential income of these children when they are young work-
ers, wt
t+2ht
t+2 their potential income when they are mature workers, and γ ∈ [0,1]
represent the household’s preferences for children. The budget constraint, where
















In this setting τf ∈ [0,1] refers to the ﬁxed costs of each child, whereas τv ∈ [0,1]
represents its variable costs associated with one unit of education, et. The left hand
side of equation (2) consists of total expenditures on consumption and children,
whereas the right hand side refers to the potential income young workers are able to
earn if they supply their whole available time on the labour market. Additionally,
we implement the assumption that people born at t − 1 do not educate themselves
in period t. Human capital stock, net of depreciation and learning by doing eﬀects,
is therefore determined at the end of childhood for the whole remaining lifetime, i.e.
ht
t+1(et)=ht
t+2(et). Optimal consumption, fertility, and education can be obtained
by maximizing utility in equation (1) subject to the budget constraint (2). Despite
the introduction of an additional generation, as compared to Galor and Weil (2000),
the results are similar:
c
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Equation (3) follows from the speciﬁcation of the Cobb-Douglas utility function and
states that a fraction 1−γ of young worker’s potential income in period t is spent on
consumption. Equation (4) describes the fact that optimal fertility increases with
the preferences for children in young worker’s utility, whereas it decreases with ﬁxed
and variable costs of these children. Finally, equation (5) is an implicit function for
optimal education. Lee and Mason (2008) propose the following speciﬁc functional







where α ≥ 0a n dβ ≥ 0 are arbitrary parameter values and β<1 would ensure
decreasing returns to scale in the production of human capital with respect to ed-
ucation. With this speciﬁc functional form, the following expression for optimal







It states that optimal education increases with ﬁxed costs of children and with
eﬃciency of education measured by the parameter β, whereas it decreases with the
variable costs of education.
2.2 Learning by doing
Human capital, net of depreciation and learning by doing eﬀects, is determined via
education of children. After the end of childhood it remains the same during the
rest of an individual’s life. However, we generalize the model by introducing two
additional eﬀects: on the one hand we allow people to forget skills and abilities over
time and refer to this as the human capital depreciation eﬀect; on the other hand
we take the possibility into account that young workers improve their skills during
the working process and refer to this as the learning by doing eﬀect. Human capital






where δ ∈ [−1,∞) is a measure for the relative size of the human capital depreciation
rate and the learning by doing eﬀect. In case that δ<0, depreciation of abilities
and skills outweighs the learning by doing eﬀect, whereas it is the other way round
if δ>0.
2.3 The decision problem of mature workers
Mature worker’s utility positively depends on consumption in the period when they
supply their available time on the labour market as well as on discounted consump-
tion from the period when they are retirees and do not earn any labour income (see













can be used as their utility function, where   ∈ [0,1] determines the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, and 1
θ is the discount factor determined by θ =1+ρ, with










t+1 (1 + δ)h
t−1
t , (10)
6where rt+1 is the interest rate between t+1andt+2, states that remaining lifetime
consumption of mature workers, i.e. consumption in period t + 1 and discounted
consumption in period t + 2, must not exceed remaining lifetime wage income of
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 −1 . (12)
Via the fact that c
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t+1 denotes the savings
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 −1. (13)
2.4 The Production Side
The production side of the economy can be described using a nested CES-production
function that accounts for productivity diﬀerentials as well as for imperfect substi-



















In this speciﬁcation Yt describes aggregate output, Kt denotes the aggregate capital
stock, N
t−1
t is the young worker’s cohort size, N
t−2
t describes the mature worker’s
cohort size, η ∈ [0,1] is the capital share of output and the parameter κ ∈ (−∞,1]
determines σ, the elasticity of substitution between members of the two cohorts as
σ = 1
1−κ. Note that for κ = 1 there is perfect substitution between the two age









can be referred to as the available eﬃciency units of young and mature workers,
























Since there are competitive markets for the aggregate consumption good, productive
factors are paid their marginal products. Thus the real wage rate of young workers,







t , the real wage rate of mature workers, w
t−2
t , and the capital rental rate, rt,a r e
given by the derivatives of the production function with respect to the productive


























Equation (16) shows that these wages increase if the capital stock increases or the
number of young workers decreases. The eﬀects of increases in human capital of
both types of labour and the eﬀects of increases in the number of mature workers
depend on the elasticity of substitution between age groups, i.e. on the value of κ.

























where increases in mature worker’s wages are also triggered by increases in the
capital stock or decreases in the number of mature workers. Now the eﬀects of
the young worker’s cohort size and the eﬀects of increases in both types of human
capital depend on the elasticity of substitution between age groups. Finally, the



















It is clear that this expression increases in the number of young and mature workers
as well as their respective human capital endowments and it decreases with the size
of the capital stock itself. Consequently, there are diminishing returns to capital.
3 Analytical Results
The analytical expression for per capita output in the steady state which can be de-
rived by inserting (4), (6) and (7) into equation (15) is rather cumbersome. Therefore
we rely on numerical results regarding the eﬀects of changes in fertility on per capita
output and per capita output growth. The related analyses are carried out in section
4. In the following we concentrate on analytical results regarding the sensitivity of
relative wage levels of young vs. mature workers. In particular we consider the eﬀect
on relative wages of changes in the relative cohort size of young vs. mature workers,
of changes in the relative human capital levels of young vs. mature workers and of
8changes in the substitutability between young and mature workers in the production
process.
























With the help of this equation the distributional eﬀects of population ageing can be
analysed and we state the following rather well known proposition:






Proof. We take the derivative of young worker’s relative wages with respect to the




























which is unambiguously negative, since κ<1. Therefore proposition 1 holds.
This result tells us that population ageing - as represented by a relative decrease
in the number of young to mature workers - is associated with increasing relative
wages of young workers. It is due to the fact that young workers become relatively
scarce if the population ages.
We next assume, that the relative size of the young worker’s labour force stays
constant, but allow for changes in the relative human capital levels of young vs.
mature workers to state the next proposition:





t as long as κ is larger (smaller) than zero.
Proof. We take the derivative of young worker’s relative wages with respect to young
































9Most interestingly, this result indicates that the better education of young work-
ers (as compared to mature workers) does not necessarily lead to a situation where
their relative wages are higher. In particular, the eﬀect of an increase in young
worker’s education has two eﬀects on young worker’s wages. First of all, it in-
creases the relative productivity of young workers which unambiguously increases
their wages. Secondly, it also increases the overall available eﬃciency units of young
labour which leads to more competition and thus lowers their relative wages. In
case that κ>0, i.e. a high substitutability of young and mature workers in the
labour market, the former eﬀect dominates. If however, young and mature work-
ers are diﬃcult to substitute in the labour market, i.e. κ<0, the latter eﬀect is
stronger. Finally, we can analyse the dependence of young worker’s relative wages
on the substitutability between young and mature workers and state the following:
Proposition 3. The relative wages of young workers decrease (increase) with in-
creasing κ, if and only if eﬃciency units of young labour are relatively scarce (abun-
dant).


























































This result states that in case of increasing substitutability and eﬃciency units
of young labour being scarce, relative wages of young workers will decrease. It is
intuitively clear because wages of young workers are comparatively high if eﬃciency
units of young labour are scarce. Suppose that in such a situation mature workers
learn how to substitute the scarce young workers. This leads to an increase in
competition among people who are able to perform the tasks of young workers and
it leads to a decrease in competition among people who are able to perform the tasks
of mature workers. Consequently, relative wages of young workers will decrease.











Starting Values Economy 1 Economy 2
N(-3) 1000 1000
K(-3) 1000 1000
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
4 Simulations
In this section we illustrate our analytical results numerically and assess the impacts
of demographic change on per capita output levels as well as on per capita output
growth rates. The parameter values for a baseline simulation are presented in table
4. We consider two economies which diﬀer only with respect to the ﬁxed costs of
children, such that the population size stays constant in economy 1 and it declines in
economy 2. Since our model includes 3 generations, the ﬁrst time period for which
all endogenous variables are available is t = 3. Consequently, the initial values of the
capital stock and the population size refer to t = −3 and are normalized to 1000 in
both economies. There is barely any empirical or theoretical guidance regarding the
parameter values we use in our simulation study. If there was such information we
used it to assess the speciﬁc parameter value, otherwise we chose reasonable ones.
The parameters α and β were taken such that human capital accumulation exhibits
decreasing returns to scale with respect to education. The value of the parameter
γ ensures that young workers put equal weight on their own consumption and the
number as well as the human capital endowment of their children. Fixed costs of
each child, τf are given as 0.1 in economy 1 and 0.11 in economy 2 such that they
amount for roughly 1/10th of young workers potential income. This ensures that
fertility is chosen at the replacement level in economy 1 and below the replacement
level in economy 2. Figure 1 plots the corresponding cohort sizes for both economies.
Variable costs of children, τv, are set to 0.1 and refer to each unit of post compulsory
education. In our case the accurate interpretation of each unit of education would
11be completed degrees. The parameter θ which is equal to 1 + ρ, was chosen to
guarantee a real interest rate of roughly 80% between generations or 3% per year.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/ , exhibits a value of 2 and the capital
share, η, was set equal to 0.25, which corresponds to historical values for the United
States (see Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987)). Finally, in the baseline scenario, workers
of the two cohorts are perfect substitutes in production, i.e. κ = 1 and learning
by doing eﬀects exactly cancel out with human capital depreciation, i.e. δ =0 .
Simulation is carried out over a period of 8 generations, which corresponds to 160
years. In the following we present 4 alternative scenarios that diﬀer with respect to
the human capital accumulation as well as the substitutability of young and mature










Figure 1: Cohort Sizes of Economy 1 (Solid Line) and Economy 2 (Broken Line)
SCENARIO 1 The results of the baseline simulation for the parameter values
given in table 4 are depicted in ﬁgure 2. The ﬁrst picture refers to the growth
rate of per capita output, which reveals that in the short-run the economy with a
decreasing population size grows faster than the economy with a constant population
size. The growth rate is, however, very low in both economies. Consequently, the
levels of per capita output do not change substantially over time which can be
seen in picture 2. Note that higher human capital investments for both, young
and mature workers, lead to higher levels of per capita GDP in the economy with
a decreasing population size. Pictures 3 and 4 show the wage levels of young and
mature workers. In the economy with a declining population, workers of both cohorts
are better educated and relatively scarce as compared to workers in the economy
with a constant population size so their wages are higher.
SCENARIO 2 In the second scenario we introduce imperfect substitutability be-
tween workers of diﬀerent age by changing κ from 1 to -0.9. The eﬀect, shown in
ﬁgure 3, is that wages in general are far lower in this scenario and therefore savings of














































Figure 2: Baseline Simulation of Economy 1 (Solid Line) and Economy 2 (Broken
Line)
mature workers are insuﬃcient to maintain the high initial stock of capital. There-
fore the capital stock decreases and both economies shrink in terms of per capita
output. However, the levels of per capita output are again higher in the economy
with a shrinking population since there, workers have higher stocks of physical cap-
ital and human capital. Again, the economy with a decreasing population size is
able to sustain higher per capita growth rates of output in the short run. There
are, however, some remarkable diﬀerences to the case of perfect substitutability be-
tween workers of diﬀerent age (Figure 2). In case of imperfect substitutability there
occurs a wage gap between young and mature workers in the economy with a de-
clining population. This result can be explained by the fact that there are relatively
more mature workers as compared to young workers in the low fertility case but
they cannot perfectly substitute these scarce young workers. The introduction of
imperfect substitutability thus increases relative wages of the smaller cohort, which
ascertains proposition 1 and proposition 3. Moreover, we see that mature workers











































Figure 3: Simulation of Economy 1 (Solid Line) and Economy 2 (Broken Line) for
κ = −0.9
in an economy with decreasing population size have a slightly lower wage as com-
pared to mature workers in an economy with a constant population size. Therefore
the overall gains in per capita output resulting from lower fertility are quite un-
equally distributed: while members of the smaller cohort beneﬁt disproportionately,
members of the larger cohort may even have to incur losses.
SCENARIO 3 In scenario 3 we additionally allow learning by doing eﬀects to
outweigh human capital depreciation by setting δ =0 .4. The results are depicted in
ﬁgure 4. Similar to the scenarios before, per capita output is higher in the economy
where the population shrinks, which is due to the larger individual stocks of physical
capital and human capital. Per capita growth of output is negative in both countries
but it is slightly higher in the economy with a declining population size. In contrast
to the former scenarios, wages of mature workers are substantially lower than wages
of young workers, even in the case of a constant population size. Consequently,





































Figure 4: Simulation of Economy 1 (Solid Line) and Economy 2 (Broken Line) for
κ = −0.9a n dδ =0 .4
these wages are insuﬃciently low to sustain the initial capital stock. The reason
that mature workers wages are that low is that through learning by doing eﬀects,
young workers become more productive in the second stage of their life-cycle. Due
to the fact that κ is smaller than 1, this implies more competition among mature
workers which reduces their wages. Altogether this case conﬁrms proposition 2.
SCENARIO 4 Finally, we allow for human capital depreciation to outweigh
learning by doing eﬀects and assume δ = −0.4. In this case mature workers only have
60% of the human capital they received by education at theit disposal. Consequently,
human capital depreciation overcompensates the learning by doing eﬀect such that
due to proposition 2 mature worker’s wages increase as compared to young worker’s
wages. As a consequence of the decreased economy-wide human capital level, mature
worker’s wages are still insuﬃciently low to sustain the initial capital stock and cap-
ital de-accumulation sets in. Therefore per capita output growth turns negative in
































Figure 5: Simulation of Economy 1 (Solid Line) and Economy 2 (Broken Line) for
κ = −0.9a n dδ = −0.4
both economies but it is still higher in the country with a decreasing population size.
To summarize, the result that an economy with a decreasing population size
grows faster than an economy with a constant population size is robust against
the introduction of imperfect substitutability between workers of diﬀerent age. Per
capita GDP is always higher in the economy with low fertility because of the level
eﬀect on per capita output coming from higher educational investments into children
and therefore higher levels of per capita human capital. Additionally, this result is
reinforced by the short-run growth eﬀect that works through higher savings.
Our results regarding the intergenerational wage gap can be summarised by
means of ﬁgure 6 which plots the relative wages of young vs. mature workers for all
four scenarios considered above. We see that there is no wage gap in both economies
as long as there is perfect substitutability between young and mature workers. The
introduction of imperfect substitutability in the second scenario increases relative











Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4
Figure 6: Relative Wages of Young vs. Mature Workers in the Four Scenarios for
Economy 1 (Black) and Economy 2 (White)
wages of young workers in the economy where young labour is scarce and thereby
ascertains our proposition 3. Increasing the relative human capital endowment of
mature workers via strong learning by doing eﬀects decreases their relative wages
in scenario 3 which relates to our proposition 2. Note that this result even holds
for an economy with constant population size although there it is less pronounced.
Furthermore we see that the decrease in the relative human capital endowment of
mature workers in scenario 4 works exactly the other way round. Relative wages of
young workers decrease because competition is reduced within the group of mature
workers. Altogether the implication of proposition 1 is revealed by each scenario: as
long as substitution between young and mature workers in the production process
is imperfect, decreases in the relative cohort size of young workers increase their
relative wages.
In addition to the described eﬀects, the introduction of imperfect substitutability
between workers of diﬀerent cohorts aﬀects the wage gap of mature workers between
the two economies: for plausible parameter values, wages of mature workers in
an economy with a constant population size can be higher than wages of mature
workers in an economy with a decreasing population size. Put diﬀerently, lower
fertility does not imply higher wages throughout the whole life cycle. Instead, the
substitutability of young and mature workers in production will determine in which
age group a smaller cohort might gain from lower competition in the labour market.
175 Conclusions
We set up an overlapping generations model with four phases in an individuals
lifetime. There are two forces which drive economic development: physical capital
accumulation and human capital accumulation. The former is triggered by mature
workers who save for their retirement. The latter is performed by young workers
who decide upon how much to invest into education of their oﬀspring. Addition-
ally, human capital accumulation can be enhanced via the learning by doing eﬀect.
Altogether accumulation of physical capital and human capital lead to a situation
where a country with lower fertility rates is able to sustain higher levels of per capita
GDP than a country with high fertility. This result is very robust against diﬀerent
parameter speciﬁcations and it is also consistent with the literature on exogenous
economic growth. Furthermore this result is intuitively clear because a decrease in
population growth leads to higher intensities of physical capital and human capital
which are, in general, associated with higher per capita output.
Regarding the distributional eﬀects, it can be stated that an increase in the
number of workers of a certain cohort decreases the relative wages of members of
this cohort. Consequently, population ageing is associated with increasing relative
wages of young workers. The impact of increases in the relative human capital of
members of a speciﬁc cohort are ambiguous and depend on the elasticity of sub-
stitution between workers of diﬀerent age. Higher education of the members of a
certain cohort has positive eﬀects on their relative wages as long as substitutabil-
ity is not too diﬃcult. Otherwise it mainly increases competition within a cohort
and therefore decreases the relative wages of their members. Last but not least,
increasing diﬃculties to substitute workers of diﬀerent age especially decrease wages
of members of large cohorts.
Our results suggest that policy-makers should not be concerned about decreases
in fertility per se but rather think about implementing accurate incentives for hu-
man capital accumulation if it is ensured that young and mature workers can be
substituted suﬃciently well. These policies, for example subsidies for education or
subsidies for on the job training to strengthen learning by doing eﬀects, are able
to increase an economies’ human capital stock and therefore overall productivity
of workers. This in turn increases per capita GDP instantly and fosters per capita
output growth in the short-run. The crucial point is that diﬀerent cohorts are dif-
ferently aﬀected by these policies. Whether a certain cohort gains or even has to
incur losses, crucially depends on the substitutability between workers of diﬀerent
cohorts. Consequently, in order to avoid rising inequality with all its undesired
social consequences, policy-makers should carefully investigate whether favourable
18circumstances are met such that both cohorts could gain. If this is not the case,
they could try to ensure that suﬃcient substitutability between workers of diﬀerent
age is guaranteed before they implement the policies mentioned above.
With respect to future research, there is a strong need for empirical investi-
gations on the sign and magnitude of κ measuring the degree of substitutability
between workers of diﬀerent cohorts, as this parameter governs the most impor-
tant distributional eﬀects. In addition, it is required to extend the analysis to large
economies or the world economy itself where the technological frontier is determined
endogenously. This is on top of our research agenda.
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